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FOREWORD
INTERESTING TIMES AT THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
THE HONORABLE KATHLEEN M. O’MALLEY*
INTRODUCTION
The decision to leave the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio and move to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit was not an easy one. Yes, I had many powerful reasons to make
the move: (1) I was honored to be nominated to a superior court after
serving as a trial judge; (2) I had great respect for the judges on the
Federal Circuit and recognized the increasing importance of the work
they were doing in the intellectual property field; (3) I was aware that
the other areas of law over which the Federal Circuit exercises
appellate jurisdiction were interesting and challenging; (4) I, like
others, believed it was time to add at least one district court judge to
the ranks of the judges on the Federal Circuit; (5) after more than
sixteen years on the district court bench, I was intrigued by the
* Kathleen M. O’Malley was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit by President Barack Obama in 2010. Prior to her elevation to the
Federal Circuit, Judge O’Malley was appointed to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio by President William J. Clinton on October 12, 1994.
Judge O’Malley served as First Assistant Attorney General and Chief of Staff for
Ohio Attorney General Lee Fisher from 1992 to 1994, and Chief Counsel to Attorney
General Fisher from 1991 to 1992. From 1983 to 1991, Judge O’Malley was in private
practice, where she focused on complex corporate and intellectual property
litigation; she was with Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur from 1985 to 1991 and with
Jones Day from 1983 to 1985.
Judge O’Malley began her legal career as a law clerk to the Honorable Nathaniel
R. Jones, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1982 to1983. She received
her J.D. degree from Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Order of the
Coif, in 1982, where she served on Law Review and was a member of the National
Mock Trial Team. Judge O’Malley attended Kenyon College in Gambier, Ohio
where she graduated magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa in 1979.

949

FOREWORD.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

950

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/23/2014 2:30 PM

[Vol. 63:949

possibility of a new challenge; and (6) most importantly, I knew that
moving to the Federal Circuit would allow me to live in the same city as
my husband, who lived and worked in Washington, D.C. I also had
some trepidation about the move—not about living with my husband
George, of course—but about other things.
Life on the district bench is fast-paced and ever-changing. District
court judges need to be versed in approximately sixty different
substantive areas of federal law—criminal and civil. They need to
familiarize themselves with the state law applicable in the districts
within which they sit and often must apply the law of other states,
even that of states far from their districts. They deal daily with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence;
with issues governing venue, personal jurisdiction, subject matter
jurisdiction, standing and conflicts of law, sentencing guidelines, and
forfeiture statutes; and are often called upon to respond to emergency
filings or requests to authorize electronic surveillance in a criminal
case. No two days are alike, and the nature of each is unpredictable.
In fulfilling their duties, district judges regularly interact with
parties, counsel, and the public—the latter through oversight of petit
and grand juries as well as through their ceremonial functions and
obligations, such as the swearing-in of new citizens. Trial judges are
not only exposed to those local counsel who appear regularly before
them but are privileged to interact with parties and counsel from all
over the world, who often appear in complex, consolidated, or multidistrict litigation matters.
In short, life on the district bench is never dull and rarely lonely,
and I loved it. This was the source of my concern. I feared that life
on the Federal Circuit, or any circuit court, would be quiet, even
monastic. I had visions of an isolated life filled with nothing but
reading and writing. And, I feared that I might find the Federal
Circuit’s jurisdictional reach too limiting; I wondered whether I
would ever again tangle with thorny constitutional, jurisdictional, and
procedural issues. My fears were not well-founded.
In fact, I sometimes wonder whether I am living a life defined by
the ancient curse, “[m]ay [you] live in interesting times.”1 The last
three years certainly have been an interesting time to serve on the
Federal Circuit, and there seems little chance that will change soon.
The reasons are varied; I will touch on just a few.

1. See Robert F. Kennedy, Address at the University of Capetown (June 6, 1966),
available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference
/RFK-Speeches/Day-of-Affirmation-Address-as-delivered.aspx.
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CHANGES IN THE MAKE-UP OF THE COURT
I am privileged to have stepped into the seat on the court once
filled by Alvin A. Schall. When Judge Schall assumed senior status on
October 5, 2009, he created the first vacancy on the court in five
years. In the now four-and-a-half years since Judge Schall created that
vacancy, six new judges have joined the court, including me. After
over five years of no personnel changes on the court, six seats have
turned over in less than that same amount of time.
The other judges who have left, and those who have taken their
place, are Judge Haldane Robert Mayer (assumed senior status June
2010), succeeded by Judge Jimmie V. Reyna (sworn in April 2011);
Judge Arthur J. Gajarsa (assumed senior status July 2011, retired June
2012), succeeded by Judge Evan J. Wallach (sworn in November
2011); Chief Judge Paul Michel (retired May 2010), succeeded by
Judge Richard G. Taranto (sworn in March 2013); Judge Richard
Linn (assumed senior status October 2012), succeeded by Judge
Raymond T. Chen (sworn in August 2013); and Judge William C.
Bryson (assumed senior status January 2013), succeeded by Judge
Todd M. Hughes (sworn in September 2013). These personnel
changes have dramatically altered the seniority structure on the
court; once long-term junior members of the court are now regularly
the senior-most members on assigned panels, thus having the
privilege of acting as the presiding judge over those panels.
A restructuring of seniority is not the only change to the court
brought by these vacancies and new appointments. In addition to
gaining its first-ever district court judge, the court now has its first
member of the trade bar, first Hispanic-American, first former judge
from the U.S. Court of International Trade, first Supreme Court
practitioner in over a decade, first appointee directly from a senior
position at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), first
Asian-American judge appointed since 1982, first appointee directly
from the Civil Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, and its first
openly gay member. Thus, while the court is blessed with the
continuity and experience of six active, long-term members of the
court and six actively contributing senior judges, there are also six
new judges, from varied backgrounds, who will help reshape the
court going forward.
NEW INITIATIVES AT THE COURT
In addition to the changes in its make-up, the court has been
undergoing a number of other changes under the leadership of
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Chief Judge Randall R. Rader, who became Chief Judge shortly
before I joined the court. The court has instituted an electronic case
management and case filing system—a long-overdue movement into
the modern litigation era that creates increased efficiencies for both
the court and counsel and improves public access to the court’s
activities. We also have worked with our Advisory Committee and
district court judges to explore more efficient and less costly litigation
methods, have worked to make our Clerk’s Office more efficient and
user-friendly, and have acknowledged the worldwide impact of the
issues that come before us and the decisions we make by exploring
opportunities to engage in dialogue with our foreign counterparts
regarding enforcement of intellectual property rights in our
respective countries. And, we have responded to budget cuts by
searching for ways to operate more efficiently and economically,
including reformatting our mediation program to make use of
volunteer mediators—both from private practice and from other
parts of the judiciary.
SUBSTANTIVE ACTIVITY
The active pace at the court has not all been structural or processoriented. In the midst of this fast-paced change, we have delved into
a number of substantive and complex legal questions from across all
areas of our jurisdiction, taking cases en banc at a rapid and
continuing rate. Since I have joined the bench, the court has handed
down ten en banc decisions:
TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp.2: Holding that (1) the district court did
not abuse its discretion in holding contempt proceedings; (2) the
district court should have evaluated the modified feature of a newly
accused product under the “colorable differences” test; (3) EchoStar
was not allowed to assert as a defense to contempt that the injunction
was overly vague; and (4) EchoStar waived the argument that the
injunction was unlawfully overbroad.3
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.4: Holding that (1) a
“misrepresentation or omission [that] amounts to gross negligence or
negligence under a ‘should have known’ standard does not satisfy the
inequitable conduct intent requirement”; (2) when a weak showing
of intent may be sufficient to find inequitable conduct based on a
strong showing of materiality (or vice versa), the district court should

2. 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
3. Id. at 881, 884, 889.
4. 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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not use a “sliding scale”; (3) the district court may not infer intent
solely from materiality; rather, it must weigh evidence of intent to
deceive, independent of materiality; (4) to meet “clear and
convincing evidence,” specific intent to deceive must be the one most
reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence; (5) intent
to deceive cannot be found when multiple inferences may be drawn;
(6) the patentee does not have to offer a good faith explanation
unless the alleged infringer first proves a threshold level of intent to
deceive; and (7) the district court should use a “but-for” materiality
test to establish inequitable conduct.5
Bush v. United States6: Holding that no deficiency notices from the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) are necessary under the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 for assessments of tax
deficiencies that constitute computational adjustments following
settlements with the IRS.7
CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.8: Affirming, by an
equally divided court, the district court’s holding that asserted system,
method, and computer-readable claims directed to computerimplemented software were not directed to eligible subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.9
Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.10: Holding that a
defendant may be liable for inducing patent infringement under 35
U.S.C. § 271(b), when the defendant has (1) performed some of the
steps of the claimed method and induced others to complete the
remaining steps; or (2) the defendant has induced others to
collectively perform all of the steps of the claimed method but no
single party has performed all of the steps.11
Beer v. United States12: Holding that legislation that prevented
judges from receiving cost-of-living adjustments awarded to other
federal employees constitutes a diminution of judicial compensation
in term, violating the Compensation Clause.13

5. Id. at 1290–91.
6. 655 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
7. Id. at 1324, 1334.
8. 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct.
734 (2013).
9. Id. at 1273.
10. 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 134 S.
Ct. 895 (2014).
11. Id. at 1309.
12. 696 F.3d 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1997 (2013).
13. Id. at 1185–86.
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Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp.14: Holding that the
Federal Circuit has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) to hear
appeals from patent infringement liability determinations, even if a
trial on damages has not yet occurred, because a trial on damages
and a determination of willfulness falls within the meaning of an
“accounting” for purposes of § 1292(c)(2).15
Kaplan v. Conyers16: Holding that Department of the Navy v. Egan17
prohibits the Merit Systems Protection Board from reviewing the U.S.
Department of Defense’s determinations of employee eligibility for a
“sensitive” position, regardless of whether the position requires access
to classified information.18
Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Electronics North America Corp.19:
Holding that, under the principles of stare decisis, the Federal Circuit
shall retain plenary review of district court claim construction rulings
as announced in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.20
In short, in just a few years, we have collectively tackled some of the
most complex and highly debated questions arising under and
relating to patent law. But, we have not limited ourselves to patent
law questions, also tackling difficult jurisdictional, constitutional, and
administrative issues.
Even outside the en banc arena, these last three-plus years have
seen numerous developments in the law, especially in the law
governing intellectual property disputes. For instance, we have made
progress in clarifying the law governing invalidity challenges
premised on the contention that the asserted claims in a patent
would have been obvious to one of skill in the art at the time the
patent was issued.21 While it is true that there is still a need for more
14. 719 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc).
15. Id. at 1318–20.
16. 733 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Northover v.
Archuleta, 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014).
17. 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
18. Kaplan, 733 F.3d at 1155.
19. 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
20. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc); see Lighting Ballast, 744 F.3d at 1284.
21. See, e.g., Leo Pharm. Prods., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 1356–58 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (emphasizing that the USPTO must consider objective evidence of
nonobviousness as “part of the whole obviousness analysis, not just an afterthought,”
and making clear that, where the prior art gives only general guidance as to the form
of the claimed invention or how to achieve it, relying on an obvious-to-try theory,
without more, to support an obviousness finding is impermissible); Apple Inc. v. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 725 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that the International
Trade Commission must consider objective indicia of nonobviousness before
determining whether the claimed invention would have been obvious to one of skill
in the art at the time of invention); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc., 689
F.3d 1368, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (stating that the focus of the obviousness-type
double patenting doctrine rests on preventing a patentee from claiming an obvious
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clarity in this area, we have made great strides to explain the
governing principles.
On another front, we have addressed gaps in our damages
jurisprudence and have made clear that damages awards must be
governed by sound economic principles and theory and be tethered
to the facts. Indeed, Susan Davies, former White House Deputy
Counsel and now partner at Kirkland & Ellis LLP, once commented
that the Federal Circuit is “rockin’ the damages issue” in patent
cases.22 Examples of our developing jurisprudence in this area
include Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc.,23 LaserDynamics, Inc.
v. Quanta Computer, Inc.,24 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,25
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc.,26 and Lucent Technologies., Inc. v.
Gateway, Inc.27 Again, while our work in this area is not complete,
trial courts and parties have received substantive guidance regarding
the scope of permissible damages in patent actions in recent years.
We have also addressed the implications of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.28 and the
circumstances under which permanent injunctions remain
appropriate in patent actions. In Robert Bosch, for example, while
confirming that eBay abrogated the presumption of irreparable harm
as it applied to determining the propriety of injunctive relief, we
variant of what it has previously claimed, not what it has previously disclosed); Mintz
v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (reaffirming that
objective indicia evidence must be considered in the obviousness analysis and can
sometimes be the most powerful evidence of nonobviousness); In re
Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d
1063, 1077–80 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (rejecting a burden-shifting framework where
objective evidence of nonobviousness is considered only after making a prima facie
obviousness determination), cert. denied sub nom. Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Eurand, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
22. Susan Davies, Remarks at the ChIPs Women in IP National Summit (Oct.
10, 2012).
23. 694 F.3d 10, 33 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (rejecting royalty rate premised on expert
testimony that was conclusory, speculative, and inconsistent with economic reality),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1291 (2013).
24. 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (stating that, when a small element of a
multi-component product is accused of infringement, royalties are generally based
on the “smallest salable patent-practicing unit” (quoting Cornell Univ. v. HewlettPackard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283 (N.D.N.Y. 2009))).
25. 632 F.3d 1292, 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (rejecting a presumptive “25
percent rule” and holding that the entire market value rule allows a patentee to
assess damages based on the entire value of the accused product only when the
patented feature drives customer demand for the product).
26. 594 F.3d 860, 868–89 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (vacating a damages
award when it was based on licenses having no relation to the claimed invention).
27. 580 F.3d 1301, 1335–40 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (vacating damages award in light of
past licensing agreements that indicated that the royalty rate was unreasonable for
the patented feature).
28. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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made clear that eBay should not be read to prohibit or even counsel
against entry of a permanent injunction where application of the
equitable factors indicate an injunction is appropriate.29 And, we
have made clear that it is error to fail to enter a permanent
injunction where the circumstances warrant one.30 At the same time,
we have explained—and outlined the contours of the requirement—
that there must be some causal nexus between an infringed feature in
a product and the consumer demand for that product before a
permanent injunction barring that product can issue.31 As more posteBay cases make their way to this court, I expect that our need to
weigh in on the circumstances in which permanent injunctive relief is
warranted will continue.
In short, while few issues the court has tackled in the last three
years have been easy, the court has not hesitated to meet them headon, incrementally clarifying important areas of the law.
SUPREME COURT INTEREST IN THE COURT
We are not the only ones who have recognized the increasing
importance of intellectual property law and the disputes arising
thereunder. The Supreme Court has shown an increasing interest in
the area and the cases we are deciding. While I again focus only on
the Supreme Court’s activity in the last three years, those years have
seen an unprecedented willingness by the Supreme Court to wade
into areas falling within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction, especially
issues arising under the Patent Act.32 Since January 1, 2011, the
Supreme Court has decided thirteen cases coming out of our court.33
And we are awaiting decisions in a number of others:
29. Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149–50 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
30. See Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1345–46
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
31. See, e.g., Apple v. Samsung Elecs., Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1361–64 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (holding that the irreparable harm factor must be treated the same in both
preliminary and permanent injunction contexts such that a causal nexus exists under
either circumstance).
32. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–376 (2012).
33. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014),
rev’g 496 F. App’x 57 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys.,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014), vacating 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Medtronic, Inc.
v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 846 (2014), rev’g 695 F.3d 1266
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107, 2120 (2013), aff’g in part and rev’g in part 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1896–97 (2013), aff’g 675 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc); Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 (2013), aff’g 657
F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
511, 523 (2012), rev’g 637 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011); United States v. Bormes, 133 S.
Ct. 12, 20 (2012), vacating 626 F.3d 574 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct.
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CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp. Pty Ltd.: The question presented
to the Supreme Court is “[w]hether claims to computer-implemented
inventions—including claims to systems and machines, processes, and
items of manufacture—are directed to patent-eligible subject matter
within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101 as interpreted by this Court.”34
This case is significant both because of the implications it will have on
the continuing vitality of software patents and because the Federal
Circuit was so severely divided at the en banc stage.
Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.: The question
presented to the Supreme Court is “[w]hether the Federal Circuit
erred in holding that a defendant may be held liable for inducing
patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) even though no one
has committed direct infringement under § 271(a).”35 This case is
significant because the Federal Circuit’s en banc holding makes many
financial services and technology-based patents more amenable to
infringement claims.
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments36: The questions presented to the
Supreme Court are whether (1) “the Federal Circuit’s acceptance of
ambiguous patent claims with multiple reasonable interpretations—
so long as the ambiguity is not ‘insoluble’ by a court—defeats the
statutory requirement of particular and distinct patent claiming,” and
(2) “the presumption of validity dilute[s] the requirement of
particular and distinct patent claiming.”37 This case will allow the
Court to directly address a notion, in some circles, that many patents
issued by the Patent Office are unduly broad, allowing inventors to
extend their claims beyond reasonable bounds.
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA v. Sandoz, Inc.38: The question on which
the Supreme Court granted certiorari is “[w]hether a district court’s
1690, 1700–01 (2012), aff’g 625 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); Caraco Pharm.
Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1688 (2012), rev’g 601 F.3d 1359
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1305 (2012), rev’g 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Beer v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
2865, 2865–66 (2011) (mem.), vacating 361 F. App’x 150 (Fed. Cir. 2010); United
States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1730–31 (2011), rev’g 559 F.3d
1284 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
34. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, No. 13298 (U.S. Sept. 4, 2013), 2013 WL 4768483, at *i; see CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty.,
717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013).
35. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai
Techs., Inc., No. 12-786 (U.S. Dec. 28, 2012), 2012 WL 6759741, at *1; see Akamai
Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(per curiam), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895 (2014).
36. 715 F.3d 891 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014).
37. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
No. 13-369 (U.S. Sept. 21, 2013), 2013 WL 5305648, at *i.
38. 723 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 1761 (2014).
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factual finding in support of its construction of a patent claim term
may be reviewed de novo, as the Federal Circuit requires (and as the
panel explicitly did in this case), or only for clear error, as Rule
52(a) requires.”39
In short, the Supreme Court has shown a heightened level of
interest in what this court does and in whether we are doing it
correctly. Changes in the legal standards the Federal Circuit employs
or in the governing standard of review may impact the court’s
jurisprudence across a wide spectrum of cases.
WHITE HOUSE AND CONGRESSIONAL ATTENTION
It is not just the Supreme Court that is scrutinizing the matters that
come before us or recognizing the issues’ importance. The President
of the United States has taken an interest in patent litigation, even
mentioning the need for a stronger patent system to foster innovation
in his 2014 State of the Union address.40 These comments echoed
recent White House announcements regarding the need to address
abuses in the patent litigation system and streamline the costs imposed
on businesses by such abuses, while at the same time being cautious
not to curb the innovation that a strong patent system can encourage.41
Both because of the White House calls for reform and its own
independent concerns, Congress also has shown willingness, and an
apparent continuing desire, to redefine the patent laws in ways not
done since passage of the Patent Act in 1952. It took seven years to
pass the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, which was signed into law
on September 16, 2011,42 and the sweeping changes in USPTO
practice set forth therein have neither been fully implemented nor
tested. Yet, we are already seeing proposals for additional reforms,
this time addressing the way patent litigation is conducted by the
courts. Congress is currently considering numerous legislative
proposals whose avowed purpose is to curb litigation abuses. Their
39. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
No. 13-854 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2014), 2014 WL 230926, at i.
40. See President Barack Obama’s State of the Union Address, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 28
2014), http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state
-union-address (“And let’s pass a patent reform bill that allows our businesses to stay
focused on innovation, not costly, needless litigation.”).
41. See, e.g., Fact Sheet—Executive Actions: Answering the President’s Call to Strengthen
Our Patent System and Foster Innovation, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/20/fact-sheet-executive-actions
-answering-president-s-call-strengthen-our-p (announcing executive actions, such as
“[p]romoting transparency” in patent ownership information, training examiners to
rigorously examine “functional claims,” and strengthening International Trade
Commission exclusion order enforcement).
42. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
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apparent primary focus is on how trial court judges manage those
patent cases that come before them—dictating everything from
pleading requirements, the extent and timing of discovery, stays of
litigation against certain parties, and whether and when courts
should award fees to a prevailing party. These proposals would even
go so far as to require the Supreme Court to change certain Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and to direct the Administrative Office for
the U.S. Courts to expend resources to conduct studies regarding
litigation practices in patent cases.43
While the advisability or workability of these proposals are topics
beyond the scope or the purpose of this discussion, they further
evidence the extent to which the matters that come before the
Federal Circuit have increased in importance and visibility over
recent years and thus demand greater vigilance by the court
regarding their stewardship.
CONCLUSION
Overall, life on the Federal Circuit has proven far from quiet. The
issues with which the court grapples are neither limited nor
uncomplicated—they are as thorny as the most complicated issues I
saw while on the district bench. In my time here, the court has dealt
with questions involving complex jurisdictional, constitutional, and
statutory questions, which include, but are certainly not limited to,
those involving patents and other areas of intellectual property. The
court has been addressing these matters, moreover, in the midst of
increased scrutiny regarding its activities from the Supreme Court,
the other two branches of government, and the public. And, the
court has been doing so while adjusting to its internal changes and in
the midst of its efforts to improve the services it offers to litigants and
the public. It has been an interesting and fast-paced time to join the
court, providing a professional challenge I did not anticipate. It is
one that I, however, like the rest of my colleagues, hope to continue
to meet undaunted.

43. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 6(c)(1) (2013) (requiring
the Supreme Court to eliminate Form 18 in the Appendix to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure relating to complaints filed for patent infringement); Patent
Transparency and Improvements Act of 2013, S. 1720, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013)
(describing procedures to obtain a stay against a “covered consumer,” meaning “a
party accused of infringing a patent or patents in dispute based on a covered product
or process”); Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. § 8 (2013)
(requiring studies on patent transactions, quality, and examination).

